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This study provides a desk-research overview of the corruption control strategies, especially on 
the implementation of rewards and incentive, monitoring, whistleblowing system, anti-corruption 
agencies and punishment. This study, in essence, use desk-research approach, with reliance on the 
secondary source of data, notably articles in published journals. This study finds that rigorous 
empirical evaluation of corruption control strategies is scarce yet promising. From the review, this 
article implies that corruption is indeed a multifaceted problem, therefore relying on a particular 
strategy might not be sufficient to curb corrupt acts. The implication for the design of anti-
corruption policy is discussed.  
 





Corruption has been long studied in a myriad of disciplines. Some studies in economics study 
corruption on its relation with the macro-economic consequences, such as reduce economic growth 
(Chang and Hao, 2017; Gründler & Potrafke, 2019; Huang, 2016; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; 
Swaheleen, 2011), impact international and domestic trade (Bjørnskov, 2012; Krueger, 1974) and 
trap a country in poverty for the long run (Aidt, 2009). Corruption in political science explores the 
relationship between power and corruption (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 1991), how corruption affects 
the public's support for the government (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Banerjee, Green et al., 2010; 
Ferraz & Finan, 2008), and effect democracy (Rock, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Corruption 
has also become the subject of interest for the scholars in sociology and management, especially 
on its relation with culture (Barr & Serra, 2010; Banuri & Eckel, 2012; Fisman & Miguel, 2007), 
norm (Abbink et al., 2018; Cameron, 2009) and accountability (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). 
Corruption which is considered as a trillion-dollar international financial crime is also one of the 
appeals of why this topic is a growing field. Despite the inconclusive definition of what constitute 
corruption (Gorta, 2006), but some scholars argue that the cost of corruption is roughly calculated 
up to $2.6 trillion a year, which represents 5 per cent of the global domestic product (Graycar & 
Sidebottom, 2012). The number might be even higher than what it is reported, but the lack of 
consensus of what constitutes as corruption has made it very tricky to estimates the prevalence of 
corruption reliably (Gorta, 2006). Nevertheless, a variety of rules, policies, and tools have been 
executed in many countries and make anti-corruption as a global campaign or Sampson (2010) 




refer it as the anti-corruption industry. This led to the rising awareness of the anti-corruption effort. 
Many countries and organizations became more conscious of the corruption controls and made it 
as part of their larger governance agenda. Hence, along with the consensus from policymakers and 
scholars about the importance of corruption control, it is crucial to understand of which anti-
corruption strategies that have been succeeded.  
 
With that being said, the motivation of this paper is to support the evidence-based policymaking 
on the anti-corruption strategy by providing an overview and scholarly knowledge on corruption 
control strategies and provide information about the evidence of the relative effectiveness of 
different types of control to mitigate corruption. To achieve this objective, two research questions 
were established: 
RQ1. What are the types of anti-corruption control strategies have been studied? 
RQ2. How is the effectiveness of each type of anti-corruption control strategies? 
The article is organized as follows. First, a methodology section details how the desk-research was 
conducted. Second, the overview of the literature collection on corruption control strategies. Third, 
the implication for the design of future anti-corruption strategy. Finally, in conclusion, we discuss 
the lessons learned about anti-corruption control strategies and suggest an outlook for future 
research.  
2. Research Methodology   
 
This paper is, in essence, a desk-research with reliance on the secondary source of data. The data 
were collected mainly from published journals. Other sources of data include online articles, 
government and NGO reports. The desk research approach was selected for two reasons. Firstly, 
it is relatively efficient and cost-effective. Desk research offers a way to explore the different types 
of control strategies which already being studied and other enormous information available into 
synthesis. Secondly, one of the advantages of desk-research is its ability to effectively use existing 
sources, for example, journal publications, books, online articles and government and NGO reports 
from a variety of sources (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2005). Furthermore, in desk research, there 
is minimal interference of the researcher with the research situation; therefore, it reduced threats 
to data validity and reliability (Van Thiel, 2014).  
To conduct desk research, several steps are employed. First, is to set the research question. The 
research question is an essential early step to guide as well as to help focus the search of data or 
information. As already mention in the Introduction section, the research questions in this study 
are "What are the types of anti-corruption control strategies? and "How effective the anti-
corruption control strategies being implemented?". Moving on to the second step is to identify the 
sources of information. For the purpose of this study, I largely rely on Google Scholar to find 
relevant information. The Google Scholar was chosen because it helps navigate the study of anti-
corruption control strategies across disciplines. Next is to set relevant keywords. Very specific 
keywords had undertaken since the beginning to produce the most effective thread using Boolean 
logic. The umbrella term "corruption" is used so that the search will not erroneously with other 




types of crimes. Last but not least is the data analysis and review. On this stage, previously 
collected literature was sorted into two categories according to the research questions.   
 
3. Results and Analysis: Corruption Control Strategies  
 
While there is an enormous number of corruption studies, the lack of consensus of corruption 
definition persists. It leads a challenge to academics and policymakers to definitely state what 
corruption actually is, and it may undermine efforts to control corruption. Hence, to avoid 
confusion, in this paper, the corruption definition from Transparency International is used, that is, 
"the abuse of entrusted power for private gain".   
One of the particular aims of this study is to overview the corruption control strategies and the 
effectiveness of such control in a particular condition. Based on the desk-research study, there are 
(at least) two approaches to corruption control. First, ex-ante control, in which the organizations 
establish appropriate systems, procedures and protocols to discourage individuals or agencies from 
engaging in corrupt behaviour. Second, ex-post control, in which the government or authorities 
conduct an action, which is mostly by capturing and punishing the corruptor after the corruption 
occurs.  
3.1 Ex-Ante Control Strategy 
 
Pre control strategy advocates that to reduce corruption, the elimination of opportunities is a must, 
as such individuals who benefit from them cease to be able to do so. This strategy attempts to 
provide one set of rules to deter motivated individuals from engaging in corrupt behaviour. There 
are myriad of tools found in the literature for corruption prevention approach. 
3.1.1 Rewards and Incentives  
 
The underlying argument for a relationship between rewards and incentives with corruption level 
is relatively straightforward, that corruption is perceived as morally acceptable when the incentives 
are low, therefore, increasing rewards and incentives is legitimate to deter corruption. There is a 
line of research that highlight the lack of incentives as the factor that flourish corruption (Hanlon, 
2004; Polese, 2008). A very critical paper from Hanlon (2004) describes how donors organizations 
contributed to the cycle of a never-ending corruption in Mozambique. For the country to meet the 
requirements to the donor's organization, it has to cut wages of its civil servants. He argues that 
the civil servants in Mozambique were paid very low even to provide basic services. This situation 
caused many civil servants to inquired additional payments or otherwise took the day off to get 
more money due to the desperation to feed their families. In parallel with these circumstances, the 
donor's organizations started to give a higher stipend to civil servants to work with them. 
Therefore, instead of committed fully to work to the government, these civil servants have to split 
their work commitment to the donor organizations that pay them. Hanlon (2004) argues that the 
aforementioned situation plainly degrades the capacity while at the same time weakening the 
government.  




Polese (2008), in his ethnographic study, also describes how the socio-economic network in a 
country could contribute to the corruption epidemic. In his study, he illustrates that as of 2008, the 
Ukrainian government is still willing to unofficially tolerate bribery as long as this avoids demands 
for higher wages. This leads to the spread of corruption acts in many forms as the cause of the 
inability of public servants to provide their needs.  
These above mention papers illustrate how the austerity of the state's capacity to wage its civil 
servants cause corruption to flourish. However, there is another stream of research which indicate 
that increasing wages do not automatically reduce corruption (Fjeldstad, 2003; Gong & Wu, 2012; 
Shore, 2005). Fjeldstad (2003) illustrates that as an attempt for reformation in the tax 
administration, the Tanzania Revenue Authority is formed. One of the reform acts is to raise the 
salary of tax officials. As a consequence, there is a dramatic increase in pay rates for tax officials 
up to ten times higher than the similar position for other public servants. However, his study found 
that despite the high incentives, corruption still continues to thrive. Further, he argues that as long 
as the demand for corrupt service is high, the wage increase will end up as an extra bonus for the 
corrupt officers.  
Similarly, Gong & Wu (2012) study found that increasing civil servants salary does not 
automatically reduce corruption. His case-study based in China found that even when civil service 
pay has steadily and substantially increased, the corruption in the country remains uncontrolled. 
He further argues that corruption should not be viewed as an individual level problem in which 
economic needs and personal greediness were caused by the lack of resource. Corruption should 
be seen as complex social problems. Therefore corruption control needs more than just solution at 
the individual levels but also improvement at the legal institutions and the oversight systems. The 
reformation should be focusing on the improvement of the systems that lower the social demand 
for corrupt services.  
A survey study by Kwon (2012) suggests that performance-based pay or promotion may reduce 
corruption level. In his study, he shows that public servant who perceived that their promotion 
depends on their performance tend to have a stricter standard for corruption. This study implies 
that public servants are willing to be more engaged with their job as long as their public service 
efforts are properly rewarded.   
However, the salary increase is only one type of rewards and incentives, which targeting extrinsic 
motivation (Morse et al., 2018). Another type of rewards and incentive, which intrinsic targeting 
motivation also being discussed in several limited studies. A qualitative study by Davis (2004) 
illustrates how altering accountability networks in service provision and make changes in the work 
environment reduced corruption in service delivery. He describes that when workers are made to 
be accountable for their work, they will instil a sense of pride for the job. The motivating work 
environment also has helped prevent misconduct in the workplace because changing the work 
condition may limit opportunities for the collusion of misconduct behaviour.  
A survey-based study of 800 central government bureaucrats in Korea by Kwon (2012) shows that 
intrinsic motivation reduces bureaucrats' corrupt behaviour. He argues that the bureaucrats who 
perceived their job to be interesting have a stricter standard for corruption. He refers to the intrinsic 
motivation that drives these bureaucrats is related to their public service motivation, which is the 




desire to work for the public interest. Aside from the previously mentioned studies, there is a lack 
of empirical research supporting the effects of employing intrinsic motivation to reduce corruption. 
This indicates a call for more research attention on this particular venue. 
    
3.1.2 Monitoring 
 
Another type of policies categorized as ex-ante control is monitoring. Research on this issue 
provides mixed results on the effectiveness of monitoring on reducing corruption.  Of those studies 
show the positive effect of monitoring is from Schütte (2012) in which describes how the role of 
monitoring and prosecution are essential in supporting Georgia's anti-corruption reform. On his 
ethnographic study, he illustrates that the attempt to confront the guilty government apparatus by 
intimidating them with audit procedure and imprisonment for the former financial crime was 
effective in impelled desired behaviour. Further, these techniques have reshaped and recoded 
boundaries between the public and private as well as state and society relationships.  
Another positive effect of monitoring is shown through an experimental field study conducted by 
Olken (2007). On his study, he compares official village expenditure reports with the estimation 
produces by the independent engineers. A randomly assigned 600 village road projects in 
Indonesia is chosen to face government audits. The study found that the government audit reduced 
missing expenditure by around 8 per cent. However, he argues that the government audit might 
provide minor effect for the reduced missing expenditure because it does not automatically link 
with the probability of detecting corruption and imposing punishment. As a complementary tool 
to reduce corruption, he suggests that severer punishment based on prosecution should be in place 
and that providing audit results to the public may also serve as complementary punishment as it 
will impact the electoral choices.  
One of the concerns of the use of monitoring is the effectiveness in the long run. A study by Di 
Tella & Fransceschelli (2011) shows that extensive audits of public hospitals' procurement in 
Argentina make the cost of basic medical supplies fell by around 15 per cent. However, as the 
intensity of audit is minimized, prices increased again but stayed below their initial level. 
Similarly, another study by Bobonis, Camara Fuertes & Schwabe (2016) shows that audits were 
conducted before the election, then corruption levels are approximately 67 per cent lower than 
corruption level when audits were conducted after the election. This study shows that while 
monitoring might be effective to reduce corruption in the short term, its effectiveness to reduce 
corruption, in the long run, is still questionable.  
Another point which is important to note is that the government surveillance and or audit are 
focussing on the top-down approach in which the initiative to control corruption comes from the 
central government. Another stream of research on monitoring highlights the importance to 
employ the bottom-up approach for corruption monitoring. The bottom-up approach relies on the 
participation from society to control and observe their public officials or elites, especially in terms 
of budget utilization. 
Serra (2012) points out that the failure of the top-down approach in many countries for anti-
corruption interventions is caused by systemic corruption. This leads to the attempt of academics 




and practitioners to advocate the implementation of a bottom-up approach. However, there are 
only a few studies that investigate the effect of bottom-up approach intervention to control 
corruption. Olken (2007) shows that even though increasing grassroots participation reduced 
missing expenditure in village road construction projects, but this effect is limited. A case study 
by Veron, Williams, Corbridge & Srivastava (2006) revealed that participatory community-based 
monitoring could give drawbacks. They argue that since the economic and political interest within 
the communities is vary, some factions within the communities are willing to build a relationship 
with bureaucrats and politicians which makes them involved in the corruption network, in which 
they refer it as corrupt decentralization. Therefore, they suggest that to employ effective 
community-monitoring participation, strong centralized government institutions and or strong 
centralized political party is needed.    
As part of addressing the concern on the use of a bottom-up approach, Serra's (2012) laboratory 
experimental study indicates that combining bottom-up approach monitoring with top-down 
approach might be an effective tool to reduce corruption. Using the experimental bribery game, 
participants in the role of citizen have the power to report bribery which might be done by other 
participants. This condition statistically significant reduces the willingness of those playing the 
role of public officials to request a bribe. She argues that social disapproval of others that motivates 
the participants in the role of public officials to request bribery. However, a line of research on the 
effectiveness of bottom-up monitoring is relatively very few. This indicates a call for more 




One of the most prominent types of policies in the anti-corruption effort is the use of a 
whistleblowing system (WBS) (Gans-Morse, et al., 2018). However, there is a handful of existing 
study focusing on the effectiveness of the WBS in the anti-corruption attempt. Goel & Nelson's 
(2014) study was one of the few studies highlighting the effect of WBS to anti-corruption level. In 
their study, they employ the internet-based awareness measure of US whistleblower laws. They 
compare the search hits related to the whistleblowing laws and corruption conviction using two 
search engines (Google and Yahoo). The result of their study shows that a higher number of 
corruption conviction in the US states was attributed to the high level of citizen's awareness in 
whistleblowing laws.  
Other studies on whistleblowing typically focus on to investigates the factors that discourage 
people from blowing the whistle. Gundlach, Douglas and Martinko (2003) offer the model to 
illustrates behind the decision of why people blow or do not blow the whistle. In their model, 
individuals' attributions and responsible judgement of wrongdoing as well as the cost-benefit 
analysis of blowing the whistle influence individuals' emotions and therefore, their decision to 
blow or not blow the whistle. In another study, Rose, Brink & Norman (2018) with their 
experimental study, argue that compensation structure and monetary rewards affect the managers' 
decision to do whistleblowing. Chen & Lai (2014) argue that potential harm and organizational 
commitment correlated with individuals' intention to blow the whistle. The higher the level of 
potential harm and organizational commitment, the higher the whistleblowing intention.   




Despite the contribution of those above-mentioned studies, the empirical study on the direct 
evidence of the effectiveness of whistleblowing on corruption level is very limited. One of the 
possible reason is that the difficulty in measuring the prevalence of WBS, which is comparable 
across the region. In other words, even though WBS has been suggested in numerous anti-
corruption design, but the study that relates to the implementation of WBS with corruption level 
is almost non-existence.  
3.1.4 Anti-Corruption Agency 
 
Due to the success of the implementation of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, such organization gained the spotlight as prominence tool to curb corruption (Quah, 
2011). There is a spark in the increasing number of ACAs formation around the world. As 
calculated by Mungiu-Pippidi (2015), in 2008, there were 100 countries had ACAs compared to 
only 12 countries in 1990. However, the effectiveness of these ACAs has been relatively 
underexplored. Gans-Moore et al., (2018) argue that this is due to the numerous factors that 
contribute to national corruption levels and therefore make a causal link between the ACAs and 
corruption level is challenging.  
Perhaps, to see how comparable the effectiveness of ACAs is by looking at the lens of comparative 
case studies. Quah (2017) investigates the performance of 42 ACAs in 27 Asia-Pacific countries. 
He argues that among the 42 ACAs, there were only 24 ACAs that were more effective. He 
attributes the success of these 24 ACAs to their dedicated focus on anti-corruption functions. In 
another study, Quah (2007) illustrates how ACAs in Singapore and Hongkong were proved to be 
more effective than that in South Korea and Thailand. He investigates that there are six conditions 
necessary for the success of ACAs: (1) the incorruptibility of the ACAs itself; (2) the independence 
of the ACAs from politics and other law enforcement bodies; (3) embeddedness in comprehensive 
anti-corruption legislation; (4) adequate staffing and funding; (5) the ACAs capability to 
impartially enforce the law; (6) the political will from the country's top leaders to support ACAs.  
Advocating ACAs as the panacea in corruption could be misleading. Indeed, even advocates of 
ACAs such as Quah urge caution about the feasibility of mirroring the Singapore and Hong Kong 
models as the policy context would be different for different countries. In addition, Doig et al. 
(2006) find that explicit emphasis on the Hong Kong Model give horrendous effect, as it leads to 
unrealistic expectations. Schütte (2012) suggests that not following the exact model of successful 
ACAs such as in Hongkong, may set expectations more realistically and even perform quite good. 
This suggestion is based on the case study of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [KPK]) that even tough follow the same approach of education, 
prevention and investigations as the ICAC Hong Kong, the organizational structure as well as 
accountability mechanism and powers are different.  
The role of ACAs has also been challenged, as countries such as Estonia and Georgia that do not 
have central ACAs perform very well in term of corruption level. Rather they employed 
decentralized anti-corruption strategies (see Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). In summary, despite the 
extensive adoption of such agencies, there is a limited study exploring its effectiveness as anti-
corruption measures. 





3.2 Ex-Post Control Strategy 
 
Another way to control corruption is when the government or authorities take actions after 
corruption occur. The word control in this sense is more like hoping that the effect will spill over, 
to create the effect that after people understand of corruption consequences, the corrupt activities 
will not be repeated and therefore can be controlled.  
3.2.1 Punishment 
 
Similar to the logic of using rewards and incentives to reduce corruption, the use of penalties to 
deter corrupt behaviour is also straightforward; raising penalties for corrupt behaviour may 
outweigh the benefit of committing it. A laboratory study conducted by Abbink, Irlenbusch & 
Renner (2002) is in accordance with this notion. Participants become less willing to engage in 
bribery corruption games as penalties for corruption is rising. However, another empirical 
evidence that supports the effect of penalties to deter corruption is very limited.  
A study by Zhu (2012) demonstrates that increasing the severity of penalties does not reduce the 
level of corruption. Moreover, it will only reduce the frequency of corruption monitoring. 
Moreover, a study by Fjeldstad (2003) found that tax officers suspension in Tanzanian tax 
bureaucracy could backfire. The reason is that tax officers are often involved in networks of 
collaborators that include public and private sectors, and tax officers who are dismissed from the 
office are frequently recruited by private companies to act as intermediaries in facilitating 
corruption.  
As suggested by Zhu (2012) to make penalties effective in preventing corruption, promoting anti-
corruption incentive is an important tool. Linking the payoffs of the officials in charge of anti-
corruption with corruption punishment could be one of the ways to promote anti-corruption 
incentives.  
3.2.2 Voter Punishment 
 
The argument for employing electoral accountability as an important tool to curb corruption has 
been proposed in several studies. A study by Anderson & Tverdova (2003) finds that corruption 
is an important component for people to judge government performance and political institutions. 
Ferraz & Finan (2008) also find that in a study of municipal government in Brazil, exploiting 
randomized corruption audits give a relatively large impact that decreases the probability of 
incumbent politicians being reelected.  
The study that examines the effect of corruption on voting behaviour is likely on the field 
experiments. Banerjee, Green, Green & Pande (2010) distributed 80,000 newspaper along with 
report cards that reveal information on legislator attributes and performance, such as attendance at 
legislative and committee sessions, spending performance, education levels and pending criminal 
charges, in Delhi prior to the 2008 election. This treatment effect 3.6 percentage point in voter 
turnout, but no effect on incumbent vote share. Another similar study by Chong et al. (2010) 




conducted in three states in Mexico. Their study finds that informing voters with corruption audit 
reports resulted in an 11 percentage point decrease in voter turnout. 
The difference in the effect of Voter punishment also found in the study of De Figueiredo, Hidalgo 
& Kasahara (2011). In their experimental field study, they distribute 187,177 fliers to individuals 
to 200 voting locations that detail corruption conviction of candidate from a centre-right party and 
a left-party candidate. The flier for the centre-right candidate had no effect on vote choice or 
turnout. In contrast, the flier for the other candidate moved 2.6 per cent of the votes relative to the 
control group and negative 1.2 per cent average on voter turnout. In summary, there is a contrasting 
result of the effectiveness of electoral accountability. Future research on the mechanism that 
explains this variation is a promising avenue for future research.  
 
4. Implications for the Design of Anti-Corruption Policy 
 
Overall, this paper finds that many of the prescribed anti-corruption policies have yet rigorously 
evaluated. However, the finding from the desk research on this paper highlight what are some of 
the anti-corruption policies that might work and outlook for future research. On this section, I 
would like to briefly discuss the implication for the design of anti-corruption strategies.  
The existing empirical evidence on rewards and incentives as anti-corruption policies indicates 
that adequate salaries are necessary but is not enough for reducing corruption. Instead of just 
pointing the importance of the higher salary, which targeted extrinsic motivation, the policymakers 
must also take into account how to trigger anti-corruption spirit through intrinsic motivation. 
Internalization of the sense of duty to serve and or induce the concern about harming others could 
serve as complementary.  
Our finding on monitoring policy notes the importance of the effectiveness of this method in the 
long run. While monitoring might give an immediate effect to reduce corruption, but its 
effectiveness, in the long run, remains questionable. Further, while relying on the monitoring 
policy, which is top-down in nature, employing bottom-up approach monitoring as the 
combination might be a promising tool to curb corruption.  
The design of the anti-corruption agency might also contribute to its effectiveness as an anti-
corruption tool. Therefore, mere establishing anti-corruption agency will not automatically reduce 
corruption. To be effective, political will from the top leaders is prominent for the success of the 
anti-corruption agency, which also has to be sustained and supported by other stakeholders (i.e. 
private sectors) and the people of the country. However, it does not stop there, equipping anti-
corruption agency with adequate budget and personnel as well as providing operational autonomy 
without political interference are also significant ingredients for the triumph of the anti-corruption 
agency. The use of anti-corruption strategy based on punishment has yet come in many forms, and 
the empirical evidence shows mixed results on its efficacy. Yet, the raise of concern on the use of 
electoral accountability through voter punishment is worth to be tested.  
As the findings of this study categorize anti-corruption strategy into ex-ante and ex-post, it is 
expected that the balance between the two is essential in the anti-corruption attempt. Excessive 




focus on ex-post measures such as punishment at the expense of the ex-ante approach will not be 
an effective endeavour to curb corruption.  
Such implication is subject to the complex nature of corruption as the collective action problem. 
Therefore, the successful anti-corruption policy and design will require collective collaboration. 




This paper has provided an overview of the corruption control strategies with a focus on two 
distinct categories: ex-ante and ex-post. Our findings suggest that adequate salaries are necessary 
but insufficient to address corruption issue, the use of policies based monitoring also be highlighted 
with the emphasis on the use of a combination between top-down and bottom-up monitoring 
approach. Our review has also pointed out the lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
whistleblowing system with the corruption level. This in fact, a promising fruitful avenue for future 
research. Anti-corruption agencies which are implemented across countries immensely, by 
contrast, face a significant challenge to prove its effectiveness. The evidence is relatively too 
limited to provide sufficient pronouncement on its performance. Similarly, there is also a notable 
lack of empirical research about the effectiveness of punishment or forms of punishments to reduce 
corrupt acts.  
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